Venue in the Federal Courts under the  Doing Business  Provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): A Provision Subject to Reinterpretation? by Lansing, Paul & Castle, Robert C.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 5
1981
Venue in the Federal Courts under the "Doing
Business" Provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): A
Provision Subject to Reinterpretation?
Paul Lansing
Robert C. Castle
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Jurisdiction Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Richmond Law
Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Lansing & Robert C. Castle, Venue in the Federal Courts under the "Doing Business" Provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): A Provision
Subject to Reinterpretation?, 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 7 (1981).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss1/5
ARTICLES
VENUE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS UNDER THE "DOING
BUSINESS" PROVISION OF 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c): A




A determination of whether venue1 is proper for a civil action
commenced in federal court requires the application of the rules
set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 13912 to the facts of the particular case.
* Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration, University of Iowa. B.A., City
University of New York, 1968; J.D., University of Illinois, 1971; Diploma in International
Law, Stockholm University, 1973.
** B.A., Knox College, 1978; J.D., University of Iowa, 1981.
1. "Venue relates to the place or places where an action may be properly instituted and
the suit determined, provided the court has subject-matter jurisdiction and the requisite
jurisdiction over the defendant. In state practice venue is normally geared to the county,
while in federal practice venue is geared to the district or, where the district is divided into
divisions, to a division thereof." 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACCE 1 0.140, at 1307 (2d ed. 1948)
(footnotes omitted).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 reads as follows:
Venue generally
(a) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all
plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
(b) A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship
may be brought only in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which
the claim arose, except as otherwise provided by law.
(c) A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be re-
garded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes.
(d) An alien may be sued in any district.
(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States
or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority,
or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise
provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the
action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the
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Making such a determination has often proved difficult for liti-
gants and courts alike because the basic rules governing venue for
civil actions brought in federal courts set forth in section 1391 are
not without ambiguity. Section 1391(b), for example, provides in
part that "[a] civil action. .. may be brought only in the judicial
district. . . in which the claim arose." The language of this sub-
section clearly allows both the narrow reading that a claim could
arise in only one district,3 and the more expansive reading that a
claim could arise in more than one district.4
In 1979 the United States Supreme Court clarified this subsec-
tion of the venue statute in Leroy v. Great Western Corp.5 This
case involved an appeal by Idaho officials who contended that
venue for the suit commenced by Great Western to challenge en-
forcement of Idaho securities regulations could not be properly laid
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas. The officials based their contention on the ground that
action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the
action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as
would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies
were not a party.
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Rules, Part 1] except that the delivery of the sum-
mons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by
certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is
brought.
(f) A civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title [28
USCS § 1603(a)] may be brought -
(1) in any judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the sub-
ject of the action is situated;
(2) in any judicial district in which the vessel or cargo of a foreign state is situated,
if the claim is asserted under section 1605(b) of this title [28 USCS § 1605(b)];
(3) in any judicial district in which the agency or instrumentality is licensed to do
business or is doing business, if the action is brought against an agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state as defined in section 1603(b) of this title [28 USCS §
1603(b)]; or
(4) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the action is
brought against a foreign state or political subdivision thereof.
3. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1977),
aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
4. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'g 439 F.
Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
5. 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
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Great Western's claim did not arise in that district within the
meaning of section 1391(b). As will be more fully developed below,6
the Supreme Court upheld their challenge and ultimately adopted
a narrow interpretation of this section of the general venue statute,
emphasizing that venue statutes, being designed to protect defend-
ants, should be construed narrowly.7
Although other commentators have thoroughly examined the po-
tential impact of Leroy in determining "where the claim arose" for
purposes of section 1391(b),8 the Supreme Court's posture suggests
that the impact of Leroy may extend well beyond section 1391(b).
The Court's interpretation of venue provisions so as to protect de-
fendants from litigation in remote forums may well stimulate the
re-evaluation of other venue provisions which have been liberally
construed in favor of plaintiffs.
This article focuses on the potential impact of Leroy on the
problematic venue provision of section 1391(c) which provides that
"[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
• ..doing business."9 The "doing business" provision of section
1391(c) is ripe for examination in light of Leroy. Currently whether
a defendant's contacts with a district constitute "doing business"
so as to permit venue to be laid in that district is determined on
the basis of two tests,10 the jurisdictional test and the licensing
test, the validity of which are doubtful in the wake of Leroy.
The jurisdictional test provides that a corporate defendant is
"doing business" in the district for venue purposes if its contacts
with the district are sufficient to permit the court to exercise its
personal jurisdiction. This test permits a court to find that a cor-
porate defendant was "doing business" in the district for purposes
of laying venue under section 1391(c) if it had but one isolated
minimum contact with the district.
6. See notes 48-52 infra and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 183-84.
8. See generally Gilbert, Venue-Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.-Supreme Court
Hinders the Ability to Challenge Extra-Territorial State Tender Offer Regulation, 5 J.
CORP. L. 396 (1980); Comment, Federal Practice-Venue-Pursuant o 28 U.S.C. Section
1391(b), Venue Found Proper Only in District in Which Takeover Statute Promulgated
and from Which Statute Enforced, 31 S.C. L. Rxv. 579 (1980).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976) (emphasis added).
10. See notes 78-116 infra and accompanying text.
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The licensing test permits a finding that a corporate defendant
was "doing business" in the district if the laws of a state within the
district would have required the corporation to obtain a license
prior to engaging in corporate activities in that state. This test
breeds confusion and uncertainty; it permits the meaning of the
"doing business" provision of a federal venue statute to be sub-
stantially broadened by state law. Under the licensing test, a state
requirement that all foreign corporations acquire licenses prior to
engaging in the most minimal activity in that state, could consti-
tute "doing business" despite the minimal activity actually con-
ducted by the corporation in that state.
Both the jurisdictional and the licensing tests allow plaintiffs to
establish venue in districts where the defendant's activities have
been minimal. Because of the Court's statement in Leroy that
venue statutes are intended to protect defendants,11 and thus are
to be construed narrowly, it remains to be seen whether the "doing
business" provision of section 1391(c) will be subjected to a restric-
tive reinterpretation which would invalidate the use of the jurisdic-
tional and licensing tests to establish venue in districts with which
defendants have had little contact.
To assess Leroy's potential impact on section 1391(c), this article
will briefly review the history of venue in the United States and
will examine the meaning of a similar venue provision of the fed-
eral antitrust laws, which provides that in an antitrust action, a
defendant may be sued in any district wherein it "transacts busi-
ness."12 The validity of the jurisdictional and licensing tests for de-
termining whether a corporate defendant's conduct in a district
constitutes "doing business" within the meaning of section 1391(c)
will be examined in light of Leroy. Finally the article will recom-
mend a better approach for determining whether a defendant has
done business in a district so as to permit venue to be laid under
11. 443 U.S. at 183-84.
12. The antitrust venue provision states:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases
may be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be
found.
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976) (emphasis added).
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section 1391(c). This approach provides that only continuous, sub-
stantial contacts with a district will be held to constitute "doing
business" within the meaning of section 1391(c), which reduces the
number of forums where corporate defendants may be sued under
section 1391(c) and provides an alternative to the current tests, the
validity of which are doubtful in light of the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Leroy.
II. THE HISTORY OF VENUE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Origin of 28 U.S.C. § 1391
Section 1391 sets forth the general rules which govern venue for
civil actions brought in the federal courts. 13 Subsections determine
where venue may be laid when jurisdiction is founded solely on
diversity of citizenship, 4 when jurisdiction is based on grounds
other than diversity,15 and when the defendant is a corporation,16
an alien,17 or an officer or employee of the United States govern-
ment. 8 Unfortunately, subsection (c), which is frequently relied
upon to establish venue in actions against corporations, has bred
considerable confusion and litigation.
In order to understand the concept of venue, it is necessary to
note that venue relates solely to the place where a court should or
may exercise jurisdiction. 19 Venue does not relate to the power or
authority of a court to hear a controversy.20 The extent of that
power is determined by the subject matter jurisdiction of any given
court. Moreover, the rights of the parties to a controversy vary de-
pending upon whether a question of venue or subject matter juris-
diction is before the court. A defect in venue may be waived by the
parties whereas subject matter jurisdiction may not. As the Su-
13. The general venue provisions also supplement the special venue provisions of certain
federal acts. See Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966). See generally Albert Levine
Ass'n v. Bertoni & Cotti, 314 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3818 (1976).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976).
15. Id. § 1391(b).
16. Id. § 1391(c).
17. Id. § 1391(d).
18. Id. § 1391(e).
19. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953).
20. Id.
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preme Court observed in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp.:
The jurisdiction of the federal courts-their power to adjudi-
cate-is a grant of authority to them by Congress and thus beyond
the scope of the litigants to confer. But the locality of a lawsuit-the
place where judicial authority may be exercised-though defined by
legislation relates to the convenience of litigants and as such is sub-
ject to their disposition.21
Despite the distinction between venue and jurisdiction, attorneys22
and courts23 sometimes confuse the two concepts. Although this
confusion may result from haphazard legal analysis, it may also re-
sult from courts mixing the concepts of venue and jurisdiction with
the tests which have been developed to apply them.2 4
The concept of venue is not a product of contemporary jurispru-
dence, but rather has its origins in the English common law. 5 The
first American federal venue statute provided that suit could be
brought in any judicial district where the defendant was an inhabi-
tant or could be found.2 8 Thus, a defendant could be sued wher-
ever he could be served. The breadth of this early statute, however,
was restricted by the limitations upon the diversity jurisdiction of
the federal courts.27
In 1887, Congress further restricted the possible forums for the
trial of a civil action. The 1887 Act provided that an action should
21. 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939).
22. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969).
23. See, e.g., Farmers Elevator Mutual Ins. Co. v. Carl J. Austed & Sons, Inc., 343 F.2d 7,
11 (8th Cir. 1965).
24. See, e.g., Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150, 155 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (venue
requires no more contact with district than personal jurisdiction under long arm statute);
Long v. Victor Prods. Corp., 297 F.2d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 1961) (adopting "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" test originally announced in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) to determine whether corporate defendant had sufficient
contacts with district to constitute "doing business" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c)).
25. See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 169 (3d ed. 1976). For a com-
parison of earlier American and English rules regarding place of civil trials, see Blume,
Place of Trial of Civil Cases, 48 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1949).
26. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470 (based on § 11 of Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73,
78).
27. C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 149.
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not be brought in "any other district than that whereof [the
defendant] is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded
only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different
States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of
either the plaintiff or the defendant."2 In 1948, Congress re-
sponded to the confusion surrounding corporate residency and
where corporations could be sued by enacting a statute, now 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c), which provides that "[a] corporation may be sued
in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do
business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be re-
garded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 29
The rules established by the 1887 Act remained largely unchanged
until 1966,30 despite their significant weaknesses.31 Although vari-
ous amendments3 2 have remedied some of the defects which
plagued the earlier venue statutes, the current statutes remain
problematic in certain respects.
The validity of the Court's position in Leroy-that venue stat-
utes are designed to protect defendants3 3-had received prior ac-
ceptance by both the Supreme Court 4 and commentators.3 5 How-
28. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, as amended by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch.
866, 25 Stat. 433.
29. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 935 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)
(1976)).
30. Wood, Federal Venue: Locating the Place Where the Claim Arose, 54 TEx. L. REV.
392, 396-97 (1976).
31. C. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 150-51. The first weakness identified by Professor
Wright is that the 1887 Act allowed a greater choice of forums for diversity cases than it
allowed for federal question cases. Professor Wright finds that illogical, for it restricted the
ability of federal courts to exercise jurisdiction in federal question cases, despite their pre-
sumably greater expertise in such matters. Furthermore, it gave plaintiffs greater freedom to
sue in districts where they resided, despite the concern about local bias which originally
justified the diversity jurisdiction. Another weakness of the 1887 Act was its tendency to
preclude suit in federal question cases in the frequently convenient forum of the district
where the claim arose, unless all the defendants resided there, or in diversity cases, unless
all the plaintiffs resided in the district. Finally, cases where several parties resided in differ-
ent states or districts were barred from the federal courts under the old Act unless -the
parties waived their venue objections.
32. For a discussion of the legislative history of these amendments, see Wood, supra note
30, at 397-98.
33. 443 U.S. at 184.
34. E.g., Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1928); General
Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922).
35. 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.140 at 1307 (2d ed. 1948). Professor Moore has ob-
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ever, courts and commentators have also observed that
determining where venue may properly be laid requires courts to
consider the convenience of all the litigants.3 a For example, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a sympathetic view
towards plaintiffs, observing that "[s]ince venue is a procedural
rule of convenience, the convenience of the aggrieved party should
be first accommodated. The court is always open to a motion based
on forum non conveniens to be raised by the other party. 3 7 This
latter view went largely unnoticed by the Court in Leroy. Conse-
quently, the decision may either be read narrowly as one in which
the Court reached a result dictated by the particular facts of the
case, or the decision may signal the beginning of a trend toward
a narrow construction of venue provisions so as to protect de-
fendants at the expense of aggrieved plaintiffs.
One commentator has noted that "[t]he concept of venue has
evolved through three stages: as an instrument for convenience of
the court, as a vehicle for protection of the defendant, and as a
mechanism for balancing convenience of the court and all par-
ties. '38 The Court's holding and reasoning in Leroy indicate its
willingness to regress to the second of the preceding stages.
B. Leroy v. Great Western United Corp.
The plaintiff, Great Western United Corporation ("Great West-
ern"), was a Delaware corporation with its executive headquarters
in Dallas, Texas. On March 21, 1977, Great Western announced its
intent to make a tender offer for two million shares of stock in the
Sunshine Mining and Metal Company ("Sunshine"), a Washington
corporation with its main operations in Idaho. As completion of
the sale would have given Great Western ownership of more than
five percent of the outstanding shares of Sunshine, Great Western
served that venue "places a limitation on the otherwise free choice a plaintiff has to com-
mence his action in any district court which has jurisdiction. And in general, affords a de-
fendant some protection against being forced to defend an action in a district remote from
his residence."
36. Note, Federal Venue Over Corporations Under Section 1391(c): Plaintiff Corpora-
tions, the Judicial District Limitation, and "Doing Business," 12 GA. L. REv. 296, 299
(1978).
37. Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 33 (8th Cir. 1973).
38. Comment, supra note 8, at 583.
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was required to comply with certain provisions of the Williams
Act, amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.$9 Ar-
guably, it also had to comply with various provisions of the Idaho
Takeover Act.40 After publicly announcing its tender offer, Great
Western endeavored to comply with the relevant federal and state
statutes. On March 25, 1977, an official of the Idaho Department of
Finance informed Great Western that it had failed to provide cer-
tain required information, and consequently, the Department re-
fused to take any further action on Great Western's application
until it received the requested information.
Shortly thereafter, Great Western filed suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The complaint
sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
the takeover statutes of three states, on the grounds that these
statutes violated the commerce clause of the United States Consti-
tution41 and were pre-empted by the Williams Act. The district
court dismissed Great Western's actions against Maryland and
New York on grounds of standing and mootness respectively. 42 By
restrictively reading section 1391(b), and thus establishing that a
claim may arise in only one district, the court found venue to be
improperly laid in Texas under the "claim arose" provision of sec-
tion 1391(b) since the most significant contacts were in Idaho
where the Idaho Department of Finance asserted its extraterrito-
rial power to block Great Western's takeover attempt.43 The court
did, however, find venue proper in Texas under section 27 of the
1934 Securities and Exchange Act which provides that venue is ap-
propriate in any district where a violation occurred. The court rea-
soned that the unconstitutional enforcement of the Idaho statute
against Texas shareholders of Great Western constituted a viola-
tion in the district within the meaning of the Securities and Ex-
change Act."
In reviewing the district court's findings, the Fifth Circuit Court
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
40. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to 30-1513 (Supp. 1979).
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cL. 3.
42. Great W. United Corp. v. KidweU, 439 F. Supp. 420, 425 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
43. 439 F. Supp. at 433.
44. Id. at 434.
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's invalidation of the Idaho
Takeover Statute on the grounds that it violated the supremacy
and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution, 5 but re-
jected the lower court's finding that venue was improper in Texas
under the "claim arose" provision of section 1391(b). The Court of
Appeals adopted what it characterized as an "expansive interpreta-
tion" of section 1391(b) by finding that a claim may arise in more
than one district for the purpose of establishing venue under sec-
tion 1391(b). 46 It further found that the claim arose in the North-
ern District of Texas because it was there that Great Western
originated the tender offer and Idaho sought to restrain the
,purchase.47
Upon review of the decisions of the district and circuit courts,
the Supreme Court found that venue could not be properly laid in
the Northern District of Texas under either section 1391(b) or sec-
tion 27 of the Securities and Exchange Act.'8 The Supreme Court
based its analysis upon the premise that statutory venue provisions
are generally intended to protect defendants from being forced to
litigate in remote, inconvenient forums.' Moreover, in reference to
the Court of Appeals expansive interpretation of the "claim arose"
provision of section 1391(b), the Supreme Court observed:
Congress did not intend to provide for venue at the residence of the
plaintiff or to give that party an unfettered choice among a host of
different districts. Rather, it restricted venue either to the residence
of the defendants or to "a place which may be more convenient to
the litigants"-i.e., both of them-"or to the witnesses who are to
testify in the case." 50
Regarding cases where a claim may have arisen in more than one
district, the Court further stated that a plaintiff may lay venue in
any of those districts where the interests of witness availability,
evidence accessibility, and defendant convenience are served with
45. 577 F.2d at 1262.
46. Id. at 1273.
47. Id.
48. 443 U.S. at 180.
49. Id. at 184.
50. Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
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equal plausibility. It emphasized that the convenience of the plain-
tiff is not to be a factor in identifying the locus of the claim which
could also be the place of trial under the "claim arose" provision of
section 1391(b).51 The Supreme Court then rejected the Court of
Appeals' findings that the claim arose in Texas because Great
Western initiated the tender offer there, and because the enforce-
ment of the Idaho statute had its impact there. Instead, the Court
concluded that "the claim involved has only one obvious locus-
the District of Idaho. '52
Although the Court's analysis of where the claim arose is not
above reproach,5" its general statements regarding the purpose of
venue and proper interpretation of venue statutes are of greatest
interest in light of this article's focus upon future constructions of
the "doing business" provision of section 1391(c). Of most impor-
tance is the emphasis the Supreme Court placed upon interpreting
venue provisions to protect defendants. While the Supreme Court"
and commentators55 have expressed that sentiment before, the
Court's position is somewhat troublesome in that it ignores the
plight of the aggrieved plaintiff. In recognition of this problem, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that "[s]ince venue
is a procedural rule of convenience, the convenience of the ag-
grieved party should always be accommodated. The court is always
open to a motion based on forum non conveniens to be raised by
the other party."5 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
has stated that the choice of forums is the primary right of the
plaintiff, and that choice should "not easily be overthrown. '57
Although the Supreme Court failed to consider forum non con-
veniens as an alternative to strictly construing venue provisions in
favor of defendants, the Court took a position as to which party
venue provisions are to protect, rather than merely holding that
venue should serve the convenience of the litigants. The latter
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally Gilbert, supra note 8, at 413.
54. See, e.g., General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261, 275 (1922).
55. See generally 1 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.140, at 1307 (2d ed. 1948).
56. Gardner Eng'r Corp. v. Page Eng'r Co., 484 F.2d 27, 33 (8th Cir. 1973).
57. Akers v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 378 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1967). Accord, Denke v. Galves-
ton, Houston & Henderson Ry. Co., 353 F. Supp. 315, 317 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
1981]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
standard, that venue should serve the convenience of the parties,
provides little guidance in those situations where the interests of
the parties diverge.58 In short, the Court used the opportunity pro-
vided by Leroy to reemphasize a major policy consideration which
should govern the interpretation of federal statutory venue provi-
sions. Consequently, it is necessary to examine both section
1391(c) and the various tests for determining whether a defendant
corporation is doing business in a district, especially in light of the
Court's posture in Leroy.
C. "Transacting Business" Under Antitrust Laws
Despite the efforts of "the great group of lawyers and judges who
labored to rewrite the Code in language so clear that its meaning
should be plain to all," 5 courts have had difficulty determining the
nature of conduct which should constitute "doing business" within
the meaning of section 1391(c).60 Much of the current confusion
regarding what constitutes "doing business" exists because the Su-
preme Court has failed to articulate adequate standards to guide
courts in their application of that provision of section 1391(c).
The Supreme Court has explained what conduct by a defendant
is required in order to find that venue is proper under a provision
similar to that in section 1391(c) contained in federal antitrust
laws. This provision provides that a defendant may be sued in any
district in which it "transacts business." 1 Views differ as to
whether the Court's interpretation of the "transacting business"
provision provides guidance in determining the meaning of "doing
business." Some courts have held the two provisions to be synony-
mous, 2 but other courts have found the two provisions to be dispa-
rate on the grounds that the "transacts business" provision estab-
58. WOOD, supra note 30, at 393.
59. Baron, The Judicial Code, 1948 Revision, 8 F.R.D. 439 (1948).
60. See, e.g., Rensing v. Turner Aviation Corp., 166 F. Supp. 790, 795 (N.D. Ill. 1958)
("Neither Sec. 1391 nor the revisors' notes supply any direct indication as to deciding how
much activity a foreign corporation must engage in before it is held to be doing business
under this Section.").
61. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
62. Dixie Carriers Inc. v. Nat'l Maritime Union of Am., AFL-CIO, 35 F.R.D. 365, 369-70
(S.D. Tex. 1964); Friedman v. United States Trunk Co., 204 F. Supp. 366, 367 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Cooke v. Kilgore Mfg. Co., 105 F. Supp. 733, 737 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
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lishes a standard which is satisfied when a defendant has had
fewer contacts with a district than is necessary to support a finding
that he had "done business" there.0 3 The latter view does not
preclude using the Court's interpretation of transacting business to
establish a minimum contact requirement. Should a court conclude
that more contact is required to satisfy the "doing business" stand-
ard than is required to transact business, it may apply the "trans-
acting business" standard, together with the requirement of addi-
tional contact.
The "transacts business" provision was first interpreted by the
Court in the 1927 case of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co.6 4 Here the Supreme Court held that a defendant
transacts business within a district "if in fact, in the ordinary and
usual sense, it 'transacts business' therein of any substantial char-
acter." 5 In 1948 the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Scophony Corp.,6 6 in which it restated its interpretation of "trans-
acts business" when it observed that the test is "[tihe practical,
everyday business or commercial concept of doing or carrying on
business 'of any substantial character.' ,,17 When these interpreta-
tions are viewed in conjunction with the facts of the two cases, it is
possible to understand what the Supreme Court meant when it
spoke of activity of a "substantial character."
In Eastman Kodak, plaintiff, Photo Materials Company, com-
menced a lawsuit in the Federal District Court for Northern Geor-
gia against the Eastman Kodak Company. Photo Materials sought
to recover damages for injuries caused by Kodak's violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.6 8 The district court entered a judgment for
Photo Materials which was subsequently affirmed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.6 ' In reviewing that decision, the Supreme
63. Friends of Animals, Inc. v. American Veterinary Medical Ass'n, 310 F. Supp 620, 622
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Pa. 1968). Cf. 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 13, § 3818 at 110, n.18 (finding this view unjustified and unnecessary).
64. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
65. Id. at 373.
66. 333 U.S. 795 (1948).
67. Id. at 807.
68. 273 U.S. at 367.
69. 295 F. 98 (5th Cir. 1923).
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Court faced several issues,70 but only its analysis of the factual ba-
sis for finding that Kodak transacted business in Georgia is rele-
vant to the question considered by this article.
Kodak manufactured and distributed photo supplies in Georgia
as well as throughout the United States. In describing Kodak's ac-
tivities in Georgia which it later held to constitute transacting bus-
iness there,7 1 the Supreme Court observed:
[Kodak has] for many years prior to the institution of the suit, in a
continuous course of business, carried on interstate trade with a
large number of photographic dealers in Atlanta and other places in
Georgia, to whom it sold and shipped photographic materials from
New York. A large part of this business was obtained through its
traveling salesmen who visited Georgia several times in each year
and solicited orders from these dealers . ... .2
The continuous, systematic nature of Kodak's promotional efforts
in Georgia was crucial to the Supreme Court's finding that Kodak
transacted business in the state within the meaning of the "trans-
acts business" provision of the Clayton Antitrust Act.1 3 Kodak's
activities in the state were in no way sporadic or unintentional.
In Scophony, the Court again faced the question of whether
venue was properly laid, this time in the Southern District of New
York, under the "transacts business" provision of the Clayton Act.
The defendant Scophony Corporation manufactured and sold tele-
vision equipment in England until late 1941, at which time it
found itself in difficult financial straits and thus looked to the
United States for capital. 4 In an effort to salvage their company,
Scophony directors entered into an agreement with major Ameri-
can motion picture and television interests pursuant to which
Scophony transferred all of its equipment, patents and other inter-
ests to the United States. 5 In 1946, the complex agreement finally
collapsed and the United States commenced an antitrust action
70. 273 U.S. at 369.
71. Id. at 374.
72. Id. at 370.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
74. 333 U.S. at 797-98.
75. Id. at 799.
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against Scophony.
In holding that Scophony had transacted business in New York,
the Supreme Court noted that Scophony had engaged in a "contin-
uous course of business" with "continuity" and "intensity. '7 6 That
business consisted of unsuccessful attempts to manufacture and
sell television equipment, the failure of which was followed by
Scophony's efforts to develop profitable licensing and patent ar-
rangements. The Court further noted that while Scophony had
pursued various paths in its effort to recovery, it never stopped or
even interrupted its intensive activity to save itself.7  ,
The Supreme Court found that the defendants transacted busi-
ness within the respective districts on the basis of their sustained
intensive activities within those districts. When defendants have
done business of a sporadic, infrequent and insubstantial nature,
such activity would hardly satisfy the substantiality requirement of
the Kodak and Scophony tests for "transacts business." Should
the Supreme Court conclude that the "doing business" provision of
section 1391(c) requires at least as much contact with a district as
is required to constitute "transacting business" as defined by East-
man Kodak and its progeny, then it may invalidate those tests for
doing business which have allowed venue to be established under
that provision on the basis of a defendant's infrequent and spo-
radic contact with a district.
D. Tests for "Doing Business"
1. The Personal Jurisdiction Test
One approach for deciding whether a corporation is doing busi-
ness within a district for venue purposes requires the court to de-
termine whether a corporation's contacts with the district are suffi-
cient to support the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Under
the jurisdictional test for doing business, a court must determine
whether a defendant has "minimum contacts with the forum so
that maintenance of the suit is reasonable and does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ,178 Under
76. Id. at 810-11.
77. Id. at 812.
78. Long v. Victor Prod. Corp., 297 F.2d 577, 580 (8th Cir. 1961). Accord, Houston Fear-
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this test a defendant need have no more contact with the forum
district to support a finding of proper venue under the "doing bus-
iness" provision of section 1391(c) than is necessary to permit the
forum court's exercise of personal jurisdiction under a state long
arm statute.7 9
Although some commentators have approved the preceding ap-
proach,80 certain courts have rejected it on the ground that a de-
fendant should be required to have more contact with a district to
establish venue than is necessary to permit a court to constitution-
ally exercise personal jurisdiction under a state long arm statute.81
Equating the requirements for venue and personal jurisdiction
ignores a fundamental distinction between the rationales of venue
and jurisdiction.8 2 Venue is a doctrine intended to protect defend-
ants from having to defend themselves in remote forums, while
long arm statutes are designed to allow aggrieved plaintiffs to gain
jurisdiction over defendants who at one time availed themselves of
the protection offered by the laws of the, forum but have since
departed. s
Another flaw in this test is that it may permit venue in a district
where the defendant has had only sporadic contact which never-
theless would be sufficient to support jurisdiction under a typical
state long-arm statute.8 4 While such statutes generally authorize
courts to exercise jurisdiction when the defendant has had pur-
poseful or foreseeable contact with the district," such minimal
contact should not be held sufficient to satisfy the continuous and
systematic elements of a more rigorous test for doing business.8 "
less Corp. v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 825 (10th Cir. 1963); Patin v. Sioux City & New Orleans
Barge Lines, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 984, 986 (W.D. La. 1966).
79. See, e.g., Stith v. Manor Baking Co., 418 F. Supp. 150, 155 (W.D. Mo. 1976); West-
phal v. Stone Mfg. Co., 305 F. Supp. 1187, 1191 (D.R.I. 1969).
80. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, % 0.142 at 1411 (2d ed. 1948).
81. See, e.g., Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463 F. Supp. 33, 36 (N.D. Ohio 1978);
Rheem Mfg. Co. v. Johnson Heater Corp., 370 F. Supp. 806, 809 (D. Minn. 1974).
82. Honda Assoc., Inc. v. Nozawa Trading, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 886, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
83. Id.
84. Note, supra, note 36, at 314.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Scotts Liquid Gold, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 184 (D. Del. 1974);
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966); Medicenters of Am., Inc., v. T and V
Realty & Equip. Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D. Va. 1974). See generally Note, supra note
36, at 314-16.
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A review of certain cases which questioned the court's power to
exercise personal jurisdiction reveals why the constitutionally man-
dated minimum contacts test is an inappropriate standard to apply
in determining whether a defendant was doing business in a dis-
trict for purposes of establishing venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
These cases show that the constitutional requirement for the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction requires truly minimal contact with a
district. When the question of whether a corporate defendant was
doing business in a district is resolved through an application of a
minimum contacts analysis, a court may reach an affirmative con-
clusion on the basis of sporadic or inconsequential conduct which
would not support such a finding were the court to use the more
appropriate analysis suggested by the requirement that conduct
which constitutes doing business be continuous and systematic.
In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,17 the Supreme Court
articulated the fundamental contemporary standard for determin-
ing when a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an absent
defendant without violating the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The case arose after the State of Washington
attempted to collect delinquent contributions which the defendant
International Shoe had failed to pay into the state unemployment
compensation fund."" Notice of the assessment was served pursu-
ant to a Washington State statute upon a salesman employed in
Washington by International Shoe, and notice was also mailed to
International Shoe's principal place of business in St. Louis, Mis-
souri. International Shoe contended that its activities within the
state were insufficient to establish its presence there, and conse-
quently, it was a violation of due process for the state to subject it
to suit.8 9 The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Washing-
ton Supreme Court's finding that International Shoe was subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the state court. That decision was
based upon International Shoe's "regular and systematic" activity
within the state. Although it had neither an office nor a stock of
merchandise there an although its representatives never made con-
tracts for the purchase or sale of goods, the Washington Supreme
87. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
88. Id. at 312.
89. Id. at 313.
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Court found "that the regular and systematic solicitation of orders
in the state by [defendant's] salesmen, resulting in a continuous
flow of [defendant's] product into the state, was sufficient to con-
stitute doing business." 90 During the years in question, Interna-
tional Shoe employed eleven to thirteen salesmen who resided in
Washington. Their principal activities were restricted to Washing-
ton, and on occasion they rented rooms in hotels or business build-
ings for the display of their goods.91
In approving the Washington Supreme Court's holding, the Su-
preme Court observed that "[w]hether due process is satisfied
must depend . . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws. 9 2 The
Supreme Court further stated:
[T]he activities carried on in behalf of [International Shoe] in the
State of Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were
systematic and continuous throughout the years in question. They
resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the course of
which [International Shoe] received the benefits and protection of
the laws of the state . .9
Had the foregoing requirement of systematic and continuous
contact remained the standard for determining when a defendant's
conduct made it amenable to a court's exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion, then the test of whether a defendant's contacts with a state
were sufficient to subject it to a court's exercise of personal juris-
diction would also be an acceptable measure of whether a defend-
ant's conduct within the district constituted doing business for the
purpose of establishing venue. This standard, however, has not
been adhered to by the Court. Instead, the Supreme Court has,
until recently, permitted a steady erosion in the quantity and qual-
ity of contacts which a defendant must have with a state to permit
the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
This erosion is exemplified by the Supreme Court's holding in
90. Id. at 314.
91. Id. at 313-14.
92. Id. at 319.
93. Id. at 320.
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McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.94 This case involved a
suit by a California resident, who was a beneficiary of a life insur-
ance policy, against a Texas insurance company which had rein-
sured a California decedent. The defendant insurance company
sent its policy of reinsurance to the California policy holder, who
sent premium payments by mail to the insurance company's Texas
office. The record indicated that neither the original insurer nor
the defendant reinsurer had ever had an office or an agent in Cali-
fornia."" Moreover, the defendant had never solicited or done any
business in California, other than that of the single policy at issue.
The plaintiff successfully sued in California and then sought to
have the judgment enforced by a Texas court, but the latter
refused on the ground that the California court could not establish
personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendant by service of proc-
ess outside California. In reversing the Texas court and holding
that the California court had properly exercised personal jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court reasoned that "[flt is sufficient for pur-
poses of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with that State."98 The Supreme Court
emphasized the contacts of the plaintiff and the insurance contract
with California, but said little about the defendant's lack of con-
tacts with California, other than to note that it had abandoned
"doing business" as a standard for determining state court juris-
diction over absent corporate defendants. 7 The reasoning in Mc-
Gee seriously undermines the use of the minimum contacts test in
determining whether a defendant was doing business in a district
for purposes of venue. Commentators have concluded that McGee
made "it clear that personal jurisdiction may be upheld on the ba-
sis of very minimal contacts with the forum state." 98
94. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
95. Id. at 222.
96. Id. at 223.
97. Id. at 222.
98. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE & 1067 at 237 (1969).
The recent cases of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) and
Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) have somewhat limited the extent to
which state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over absent defendants. However, the
test for the exercise of personal jurisdiction still requires far less contact with a district than
would probably be required to find that a defendant was doing business in a district for
purposes of § 1391(c), given the Court's position in Leroy.
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The importance of the foregoing distinction between the mini-
mum contacts test for venue purposes and for long arm statute
purposes will be even more critical in light of the Supreme Court's
concern about protecting defendants from litigating tenuous claims
in forums with which they have had little contact. Should the
Court wish to pursue the trend it began in Leroy, then it seems
likely that the minimum contacts test for doing business will come
under intense scrutiny. A challenger of this test may profitably
compare the substantial contacts requirement articulated by the
Supreme Court in Kodak and Scophony with the minimum con-
tacts requirement of the personal jurisdiction test. Such a compari-
son will reveal that under the latter test, the doing business provi-
sion of the general venue statute serves the interests of plaintiffs
while offering little protection to defendants, a result that is incon-
sistent with the principles announced in Leroy.9 9 Thus, the invali-
dation of the minimum contacts test seems possible, if not
probable.
2. The Licensed to Do Business Test
The second principal test currently used by courts to determine
"doing business" under section 1391(c) was articulated by the Fed-
eral District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Remington Rand, Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co.100 This test provides
that a corporation will be held to be doing business in a district
within the meaning of section 1391(c) "if its activities within the
district are such that its business has become localized and is an
operation within the district so that some state would probably re-
quire the foreign corporation to be licensed as a condition prece-
dent to doing that business." 10 1 This test is a product of the Rem-
ington court's analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. °2 and the legislative re-
sponse to the holding of that case.
In Neirbo, the Supreme Court held that the appointment by a
foreign corporate defendant of an agent for receipt of service of
99. 443 U.S. at 184.
100. 139 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
101. Id. at 620-21.
102. 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
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process as required by the law of the state in which the corporation
was doing business constituted a waiver of the provisions of the
federal venue statutes. That holding provided support for the
anomalous rule that a law-abiding corporation which obtained a
license thereby waived a defense based on improper venue while a
corporate defendant that failed to obtain the required license
would be allowed to assert that defense. 103 The court in Remington
concluded that the revision of the Judicial Code to include a venue
provision which applies solely to corporations represents a codifica-
tion of the Neirbo holding.1 04 The court in Remington further
stated that the language of section 1391(c) which provides that
"[a] corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business ' 10 5 is an attempt to facili-
tate the establishment of venue for actions against defendants who
fail to comply with state licensing requirements.10 6 Thus, the basic
test for determining whether a defendant was doing business is
whether a license would be required.
Although the Remington court's conclusion is not without sup-
port,10 7 and has been adopted by several courts,10 8 the licensing
test must be viewed with skepticism, especially in view of the Le-
roy Court's disfavor toward expansively construed venue provi-
sions. Even before Leroy, one commentator questioned the sound-
ness of the licensing test, reasoning first, that if Congress had
desired the usage of this test, it could easily have provided for it in
the statute, and second, that there is nothing to suggest that "do-
ing business" means "should get a license." 10 19
In addition to the foregoing weakness, the reference of the li-
censing tests to state laws governing the licensure of business ac-
103. Remington Rand Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 139 F. Supp. 613, 619 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
104. Id.
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1976).
106. 139 F. Supp. at 617.
107. See, e.g., Ruth v. Eagle-Picher Co., 225 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1955); L'Heureux v.
Central Am. Airways Flying Serv., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 713 (D. Md. 1962); J. MOORE, MooRE's
JUDICIAL CODE-COMMENTARY 1 0.03(28) at 194 (1949).
108. See, e.g., Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463 F. Supp. 33, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1978);
Trinity Metals v. Andy Int'l, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Philadelphia Hous-
ing Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp. 252, 257 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
109. Note, supra note 36, at 320, 321.
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tivity raises two problems which further undermine its validity.
The test, as stated in Remington, permits a court to find that the
defendant was doing business if the defendant's conduct in the dis-
trict was such that some state would probably require it to obtain
a license. 110 The principal weakness of this test is that it allows
venue in the federal courts to be governed by reference to state
law. Consequently, the state statute which mandates the acquisi-
tion of a license to do business on the basis of the most minimal
business activity will, nevertheless, establish a national test for do-
ing business. Under this test, the doctrine of venue is governed by
a state statute Which in all likelihood was enacted for purposes
other than to protect defendants from having to litigate claims in
remote forums. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended by
the adoption of section 1391(c) to allow a single state legislature to
dramatically expand venue in the federal courts.
The Remington licensing test provision that only "some" states
require a license for such activity apparently constitutes an at-
tempt to relieve courts and attorneys of having to review the busi-
ness licensing statutes of every state."1 Nevertheless, certain
courts have still had difficulty applying the test. Most troublesome
is the tendency of some courts to reach a conclusion regarding
whether a license would be required, without ever applying the
provisions of a particular state statute to the facts of the case. 12
For example, in Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chemical Co., the court
found venue improper merely on the grounds that it "cannot con-
clude that defendant's business can in any way be found to be 'lo-
calized' within the State of Ohio to such a degree that some state
would require it to be licensed."113 Although the facts of Lubrizol
suggest that the court reached the correct result, it is difficult to
believe that the Remington court could have envisioned that its
test would be applied in such an uncritical manner.
110. 139 F. Supp. at 620-21.
111. In Remington, the court noted that "[a] test for 'doing business' which requires ex-
amination of the laws of all the states to determine whether any one State might require a
license on the basis of the activity engaged in would be a useless yardstick." 139 F. Supp. at
613.
112. See Lubrizol Corp. v. Neville Chem. Co., 463 F. Supp. 33, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Trin-
ity Metals v. Andy Int'l Inc., 424 F. Supp. 966, 968 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Fox-Keller, Inc. v.
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 338 F. Supp 812 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
113. 463 F. Supp. 33, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1978).
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In addition to the foregoing problems, those courts which do
look to the specific provisions of a state licensing statute tend to
look exclusively to the statutes of the state in which they are sit-
ting.114 Such a parochial perspective conflicts with the Remington
licensing test because it may permit a finding that a defendant was
not doing business based upon the licensing law of that particular
state which happened to require an unusually great amount of ac-
tivity before a license is required. For instance, in Philadelphia
Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., the court concluded that although the defendant's indepen-
dent sales representative made sales in the district of more than
$300,000 over the course of less than four years, such sales did not
constitute "doing business" by the defendant as measured by the
licensing test, because the applicable Pennsylvania statute pro-
vided "that a foreign corporation 'effecting sales through indepen-
dent contractors need not be licensed to carry on such activity in
the Commonwealth.' 1 5 While the court apparently reached the
correct result under Pennsylvania law, it erred when it failed to
review the licensing statutes of other states to determine whether
some state requires even corporations selling products through in-
dependent representatives to be licensed. Had the court pursued
that course, it might have discovered that certain states did re-
quire foreign corporations selling through independent representa-
tives to be licensed, and consequently, it could have allowed venue
on the grounds that the licensing test for doing business was
satisfied.
Venue provisions are generally intended to protect defendants
from being unfairly forced to litigate in remote forums. It is diffi-
cult to see the fairness in finding that a corporate defendant may
be required to litigate a claim in a remote forum with which it has
had little contact, merely because some state requires the acquisi-
tion of a license as a condition precedent to activity of the nature
undertaken by the defendant. The licensing test appears especially
suspect after Leroy, since it allows a plaintiff to establish venue
114. See Damon Ceats, Inc. v. Munsingwear, Inc., 431 F. Supp 1303, 1308 (E.D. Pa. 1977);
Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 291 F. Supp.
252, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
115. 291 F. Supp. 252, 258-59 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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under the "doing business" provision of section 1391(c) in a forum
under a state statute which provides that the slightest activity
must be licensed. That approach yields a result analogous to the
result produced in Leroy by the lower court's expansive interpreta-
tion116 of section 1391(b). Given the Court's concern with protect-
ing defendants, it may decide to invalidate the license test because
of the broad venue which it could permit.
III. A BETTER STANDARD FOR DOING BUSINESS
In lieu of the licensing and personal jurisdiction tests for deter-
mining whether a corporate defendant is doing business in a dis-
trict within the meaning of section 1391(c), the federal courts
should consider other factors in making that determination. Al-
though the careful consideration of these factors is more difficult
than merely concluding that some states would require a license to
carry on such activities, or that those activities constitute the mini-
mum contacts necessary to support the exercise of personal juris-
diction, this approach should produce findings which are consistent
with the Supreme Court's recent statement in Leroy regarding the
purposes of the federal venue statutes. Under the following ap-
proach, defendants will be more protected from having to defend
themselves in remote forums where they have had contacts which
are only minimal or which would require a license under the law of
some state.
In determining whether a corporate defendant does business
within a district, the court should consider the quantity and quali-
ty of a defendant's contacts with the district.1 17 Moreover, the
court should not look at events or activities unrelated to the de-
fendant's commercial endeavors in the state. Instead, the court
should review "the sum total of sundry relevant activities consid-
ered in light of the circumstances of the particular case." 1 8
Given the infinite variety of contacts which a corporation may
116. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1273 (5th Cir. 1978).
117. Cf., Chromium Indus., Inc. v. Mirror Polishing & Plating Co., 448 F. Supp. 544, 550
(E.D. Ill. 1978) (Court applied these factors to determine whether corporate defendant
"transacts business" in the district within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1975)).
118. School Dist. of Phil. v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (E.D.
Pa. 1967).
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have with a district over a period of time, courts should find the
following factors to be particularly significant in determining
whether a defendant's contacts were sufficiently systematic and
substantial to constitute doing business for venue purposes:
1. Whether the defendant engaged in sales solicitation and advertis-
ing in the district.119 Such activities may be in the form of mail
order catalogues, letters and good will tours by company
representatives. 20
2. Whether the defendant's business activities in the district were
regular and continuous.12'
3. Whether an ordinary business person would consider the dollar
volume of the defendant's sales in the district to be substantial. 22
4. Whether the defendant's sales in the district were a "substantial"
percentage of the total sales of the district. 2
By reviewing the facts of a case with an eye towards the nature
and quantity of the defendant's contacts with the district, a court
will engage in what might be characterized as significant contacts
analysis. Because of the great importance which facts play in find-
ings of venue, this analysis must be undertaken with a special sen-
sitivity regarding the nature of the defendant's business. In so do-
ing, the federal courts will better serve the ends of the venue
statutes which the Court identified in Leroy, because it will enable
the courts to attach proper weight to a defendant's contacts with a
district.
IV. CONCLUSION
The various sections of the federal venue statute 24 are riddled
with ambiguous provisions, the satisfaction of which is frequently
measured through the application of confusing and sometimes con-
tradictory tests. Those provisions which permit suit to be brought
119. 448 F. Supp. at 550.
120. Wentling v. Popular Science Publishing Co., 196 F. Supp. 657, 659 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
121. 448 F. Supp. at 550.
122. Sunbury Wire Rope Mfg. Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 129 F. Supp. 425, 427
(E.D. Pa. 1955).
123. School Dist. of Phil. v. Kurtz Bros., 240 F. Supp. 361, 363 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1976).
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in the district where the claim arose 12 5 or where the defendant is
doing business 12 6 have proven especially difficult for the courts to
administer.
In Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of "where the claim arose" and more impor-
tantly, emphasized its concern that the federal venue statutes be
construed so as to protect defendants from being forced to litigate
in inconvenient forums.127 The Supreme Court's admonition that
courts disregard the plaintiff's interests while considering the con-
venience of witnesses and defendants establishes a standard for
the interpretation of venue provisions. That standard could have a
dramatic effect upon the interpretation of various venue provi-
sions, including the provision of section 1391(c) which permits
venue to be laid in any district where a corporate defendant is "do-
ing business." The doing business provision is especially suscepti-
ble to a considerably narrower construction in the wake of Leroy
because the two principal tests which courts apply to determine
whether a defendant was doing business in a district allow plain-
tiffs to establish venue in districts where defendants have had in-
frequent contact. In such cases the interests of the aggrieved plain-
tiffs are served at the expense of the defendant-an approach
which is the antithesis of the concern articulated in Leroy.
Consequently, the federal courts should discard the test which
provides that a defendant is doing business in a district for pur-
poses of establishing venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) if its conduct
within the state was such that some state would require a foreign
corporation to obtain a license before it could legally engage in
such conduct. 128 Similarly, courts should reject the test for "doing
business" which provides that if a defendant's contact with a state
is sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction, then
such contact constitutes "doing business" for venue purposes.129
As an alternative, the courts should look to a variety of factors
including the continuity, substantiality, and regularity of advertis-
125. Id. § 1391(b) (1976).
126. Id. § 1391(c) (1976).
127. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
128. See generally note 101 supra and accompanying text.
129. See generally note 79 supra and accompanying text.
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ing, solicitation, and sales in a state. Such factors are better indicia
of whether a defendant's conduct in a district was sufficiently con-
tinuous and substantial so as to constitute "doing business" for
venue purposes. Through such an analysis, courts may better pro-
tect defendants from having to litigate claims in inconvenient fo-
rums where they have had but slight contact.
Should Congress be satisfied with the presently enlarged scope
of venue under the doing business standard, then it would be wise
to modify section 1391(c) by providing a more explicit standard to
guide the federal courts in determining whether a defendant was
doing business. Otherwise, federal courts may, pursuant to the
standards announced in Leroy, construe more narrowly "doing
business" to comply with the Supreme Court's mandate that venue
statutes be interpreted with an eye toward protecting defendants,
despite the adverse impact which such a construction may have on
plaintiffs.

